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The Emerging Shape of Global Justice:
Retrogression or Course Correction?
DIANE ORENTLICHER†

I am honored to deliver the Gerber lecture, and doubly honored
to do so along with the venerable Justice Michael Kirby.
Like many international lawyers, I have had an acute sense of
whiplash in recent years. Not that long ago we saw a heady period of
global institution-building, along with the conclusion of major
international agreements like the Paris climate agreement and the Iran
nuclear deal, which tackled critically important issues. Now, of
course, the United States has left the Iran deal and set in motion the
process of withdrawing from the Paris Agreement; the United
Kingdom has been mired in the seemingly endless throes of Brexit;
and two countries have left the International Criminal Court (ICC)
while others have threatened to do so.1
As my last example suggests, the whiplash metaphor is surely
relevant with respect to international criminal justice. Recent signs of
retrenchment follow a remarkable expansion of institutions, law, and
practice in this sphere. In the space of just one decade:
•

The United Nations (UN) Security Council created two

© 2020 Diane Orentlicher.
†
Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. I am grateful to
Elizabeth Burckmyer Anderson and Erica Levin for research assistance.
1. Burundi and the Philippines have withdrawn from the ICC. The governments of South
Africa and The Gambia reversed earlier decisions to withdraw. See Norimitsu Onishi, South
Africa Reverses Withdrawal from International Criminal Court, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/world/africa/south-africa-icc-withdrawal.html; Meritt
Kennedy, Under New Leader, Gambia Cancels Withdrawal From International Criminal
Court,
NPR
(Feb.
14,
2017),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2017/02/14/515219467/under-new-leader-gambia-cancels-withdrawal-frominternational-criminal-court.
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international criminal tribunals,2 both cast in the mold of
Nuremberg, to prosecute grievous crimes in the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, respectively;
•

We saw the advent of a new breed of court, which brought
together international and national personnel and law, to
try those most responsible for atrocities in Sierra Leone,
East Timor, Kosovo, Cambodia, and elsewhere;

•

We also saw unprecedented use of universal jurisdiction,
the principle that allows States to prosecute atrocities
committed beyond their borders by and against people
who have no connection to their country except the bond
of humanity, most famously used to secure the 1998 arrest
in London of former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet at
the request of a Spanish judge;

•

And, of course, we saw the creation in 2002 of a
permanent international criminal court with a potentially
global remit.

Small wonder proponents of international justice were positively
giddy in this period, which seemed to herald the beginning of the end
of the age of impunity.
No one would describe recent developments in remotely similar
terms. Already seven years ago, the Journal of International Criminal
Justice (JICJ) devoted a symposium issue to “setbacks” in the project
of international justice.3 Two developments exemplify the wider trend
the JICJ symposium addressed.
First, the assertive use of universal jurisdiction, which human
rights advocates had celebrated when it led to Pinochet’s arrest in
1998, provoked a forceful backlash, not least from the United States.
Among other consequences, Belgium and Spain curtailed their
previously robust use of this principle.
Second, the ICC drew fire from the African Union (AU) when it
issued an arrest warrant against Sudan’s then president, Omar alBashir. In 2010, the AU called on Member States to defy the Court by
refusing to arrest Bashir, and the next year it endorsed Kenya’s quest
2. S.C. Res. 827, at 2 (May 25, 1993) (establishing tribunal for atrocities in the former
Yugoslavia); S.C. Res. 955, at 2 (Nov. 8, 1994) (establishing tribunal for genocide and other
atrocities in Rwanda).
3. Symposium, Recent Setbacks for International Criminal Justice Put into Perspective,
11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 501–570 (2013).
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to forestall the ICC’s investigation of post-election violence there. A
number of AU members threatened to leave the ICC, 4 although to date
only one, Burundi, has followed through.5
In this setting, I want to raise three questions. First—and this will
be the focus of my remarks—To what extent have these and other
setbacks resulted from the broader populist challenge to the
international legal order with which this symposium is concerned?
Second, which of these setbacks should concern us? Finally, whatever
their causes, do recent developments in the field of global justice
presage the end of an era? Or, instead, do they signify an inevitable,
and perhaps even constructive, period of mid-course correction?
Before I take up these questions, it might be helpful to indicate
what I have in mind when I refer to populist challenges. As has often
been noted, there is nothing like a consensus definition of populism,
and I do not plan to make the case for a particular one here. My
remarks will, however, be informed by several aspects of populism as
it has been defined by some scholars, whose definitions include
phenomena we can readily recognize even if we do not have a common
understanding of what adds up to a populist movement. As will be
clear, each of these characteristics reflects something of a caricature.
Individuals whom many scholars identify as members of populist
movements use categories such as race, national origin, ethnicity,
gender, and religion to exclude groups from their conception of “the
people.”6 Further, many hold that populists are skeptical of countermajoritarian institutions that protect minorities, whether those
institutions are embedded in national governance structures or are
international in nature.7 Finally, and perhaps implicit in the two
preceding points, populist movements are said to be antithetical to the
liberal values that have grounded support for many international
institutions, including the ICC.8 It follows from these characteristics
that, in countries where populist movements have established a
significant measure of political influence, we would expect to see
4. See Diane Orentlicher, Owning Justice and Reckoning with Its Complexity, 11 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 521–522 (2013).
5
See Jina Moore, Burundi Quits International Criminal Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2017, at
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/27/world/africa/burundi-international-criminalcourt.html.
6. See Cas Mudde, The Populist Zeitgeist, GOV’T & OPPOSITION 541, 544 (2004).
7. William A. Galston, The Populist Challenge to Liberal Democracy, 20 J. DEMOCRACY
5, 11 (2018).
8. See Erik Voeten, Liberalism, Populism, and the Backlash against International
Courts, CAMBRIDGE UNIV. PRESS, June 2019, at 1, 1–2.
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rising opposition to international courts that protect human rights,
particularly those of vulnerable minorities, especially when those
courts take actions likely to mobilize a country’s populist leader and/or
his political base.
So, then, are notable setbacks in the field of international justice
attributable, at least in substantial part, to a populist backlash?
In my view, they have fundamentally different origins. To be
sure, populist perspectives are deeply antithetical to the liberal
commitments that underpin and sustain global justice, and have
intensified a process of retrenchment already underway. It is surely no
coincidence, for example, that one of the countries that has withdrawn
from the ICC, the Philippines, is led by a quintessential populist who
enjoys immense popularity at home despite (if not, at least in part,
because of) his boastful embrace of extra-judicial executions as a
means of crime control.9
Even so, it would be a mistake to suppose ascendant populism is
one of the principal factors behind setbacks in the field of international
justice. What, then, are the chief drivers of this trend?
First, it is no secret that the ICC’s performance has been
disappointing. It took a decade after it began operating for the Court
to issue its first judgment.10 In several cases the Prosecutor’s evidence
was so thin the Court declined even to confirm charges; in other
instances, cases have collapsed at trial or on appeal.11 This inevitably
dampened enthusiasm for the Court, the foremost emblem of global
justice, and diminished States’ commitment to it.
Second, while the Prosecutor bears significant responsibility,
other factors have contributed to the Court’s disappointing
performance. Too often, State cooperation with investigations and
arrests has been sorely lacking except when the Court has investigated
a government’s opponents, typically in cases sent to the Court by the
government in question. This stands in marked contrast to the robust
and necessary support enjoyed by the two ad hoc tribunals created by
9. Regine Cabato, Duterte’s Drug War Still Popular Amid Deaths, Controversy, WASH.
POST, Oct. 27, 2019.
10. See Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04/01/06, Judgment Pursuant to Art. 74 of
the
Statute
(Public),
(Mar.
14,
2012),
https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_03942.PDF.
11. See, e.g., Dionne Searcey & Palko Karasz, Laurent Gbagbo, Former Ivory Coast
Leader, Acquitted of Crimes Against Humanity, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/15/world/africa/laurent-gbagbo-ivory-coast-icc.html.
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the Security Council in 1993 and 1994.
Third, parties to the ICC’s founding treaty, the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, have been reluctant to finance the
Court at the level it needs to perform effectively. Compounding this
problem, the UN Security Council has twice referred situations to the
Court while refusing to allow the United Nations to fund the
investigations the Council mandated.12 The resulting mismatch
between mandate and resources makes it all the more difficult for the
Prosecutor to conduct effective investigations.
Fourth, governments of various political stripes—not just those
falling within a particular range on the ideological spectrum—have
challenged the ICC, at times aggressively, when it has targeted or
moved closer to targeting their own leaders and citizens. This has been
the case with States that have joined the ICC, like Kenya,13 and States
that have not, like Sudan and the United States. This brand of selfinterested opposition is of course standard fare in the wider domain of
human rights enforcement.
Also illuminating are the rhetorical terms in which challenges to
the ICC have been framed. Three discursive themes have loomed large
such challenges, none of which I would characterize as fundamentally
populist.
One of the most influential narratives holds that the Court is a
neocolonial institution, dominated by Western countries yet focused
overwhelmingly on African suspects. It is not hard to see why this
charge gained traction. For more than a dozen years after the ICC
began operating, all of the Prosecutor’s investigations involved crimes
committed in African States.
While this pattern alone might have evoked the charge of
selective justice, it also frustrated a cherished hope on the part of many
African citizens and leaders who had embraced the ICC with palpable
enthusiasm. Indeed, the African commitment to the ICC was
astonishing; as has often been noted, the largest regional bloc of States
parties to the Rome Statute is African. A key reason is that many
Africans believed—and were encouraged to believe—that the new
court would upend the unequal distribution of power that defined the
postwar international order. As espoused by many of its proponents,
12. S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 7 (Mar. 31, 2005); S.C. Res. 1970, ¶ 8 (Feb. 26, 2011).
13. See generally Laurence R. Helfer & Anne E. Showalter, Opposing International
Justice: Kenya’s Integrated Backlash Strategy Against the ICC, 17 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 1
(2017).
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the ICC promised to treat nationals of all States equally; there would
be no Great Power exemption from its jurisdiction.14 And so the
Court’s focus on atrocities committed in small-power States, mostly in
Africa, defied expectations that had helped garner strong African
support for the Court.
A second discursive challenge, which overlaps with and suffuses
the others but also has independent valence, sounds in sovereignty—
in this context meaning it is each State’s sovereign right to decide
whom and how to prosecute (or otherwise address) crimes committed
in its territory and by its nationals. When, moreover, an international
court asserts jurisdiction over a country’s head of state, the affront to
its sovereignty is acute. Not surprisingly, some of the ICC’s most
vexed challenges have arisen when its Prosecutor targeted senior
leaders like then President Bashir of Sudan and the two top leaders of
Kenya.
Sovereignty-based challenges to the Court should not surprise us.
For most of the period often described in terms of the liberal
international order, the right to prosecute one’s own nationals was seen
as a basic concomitant of sovereignty. Think about it: for at least half
a century, the postwar liberal international order did not include an
international body that could prosecute individuals, nor was there a
widespread belief that such a court should exist. Even today, one can
readily find accounts of the postwar liberal order that make no mention
of the ICC or any other international criminal tribunal.15 In a similar
vein, international law has long held that a State’s courts cannot
exercise jurisdiction over the incumbent head of state and other senior
officials of another country, and the contemporary era of global justice
did not change this.16
A third thematic challenge to the ICC sounds in American
exceptionalism. As espoused by a succession of American leaders, this
perspective is suffused with notions of sovereignty. Even so, it makes
distinctive claims.
Before I elaborate, it may be helpful to note key corollaries of this
perspective. Despite significant changes in U.S. policy toward the ICC
over time, at no time in the Court’s history has the U.S. government
14. See William A. Schabas, The Banality of International Justice, 11 J. INT’L CRIM JUST.
545, 548-49 (2013).
15. See, e.g., G. John Ikenberry, The End of Liberal International Order?, 94 INT’L AFF.
7 (2017).
16. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002
I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 58 (Feb. 2002).
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accepted the proposition that the Court could legitimately prosecute
American nationals. (Similarly, the United States has opposed efforts
by other countries, notably including Belgium, to prosecute U.S.
officials for alleged war crimes.17)
The U.S. government has often explained its opposition to the
exercise of ICC jurisdiction over Americans as a logical consequence
of its status as a non-party to the Rome Statute. But the more salient
point is that it is inconceivable the United States would join the Court.
This follows from two core tenets of American exceptionalism as it
relates to global justice. The first holds that the United States has
assumed paramount responsibility for ensuring the security of the
postwar liberal international order and bears a correspondingly high
exposure to risks, including what U.S. officials have often described
as the risk politically-motivated prosecutions of American citizens and
leaders. An article in the New York Times published in September
2018, when John Bolton was National Security Advisor, captured this
theme when it summarized Bolton’s hostility toward the ICC: “The
United States … shoulders many of the West’s [security] duties. Why
then, Mr. Bolton and his allies argue, would the United States expose
its citizens to oversight and second-guessing from nations that have
benefited from a robust American military?”18
The second tenet of American exceptionalism as it relates to
global justice is that the only relevant safeguards for prosecuting U.S.
citizens are to be found in our constitution, not in the statutes and rules
of global courts. Another article published in 2018 captured both of
these themes when it described the source of American hostility to the
ICC in terms of “concerns that U.S. soldiers and civilian leaders might
be put on trial, without U.S. constitutional protections, by an antiAmerican prosecutor in a court with non-American judges.”19
Earlier I intimated that, despite the continuity of American
exceptionalism as it relates to the ICC, there have been meaningful
distinctions in ICC policy among different administrations. Brief
consideration of key shifts in U.S. policy illuminates how the populist
orientation of President Trump joins up with longstanding sources of
17. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Whose Justice? Reconciling Universal Jurisdiction with
Democratic Principles, 92 GEO. L.J. 1057, 1062 (2004).
18. Matt Apuzzo & Marlise Simons, U.S. Attack on I.C.C. Is Seen as Bolstering World’s
Despots, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/13/
world/europe/icc-burundi-bolton.html.
19. Ron Synovitz, Explainer: Why Does the U.S. Have It Out for the International
Criminal Court?, RFE/RL (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.rferl.org/a/explainer-why-does-u-shave-it-out-for-international-criminal-court-/29484529.html.
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U.S. opposition to the ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction over American
citizens and, in consequence, poses a heightened challenge to the
Court.
As is well known, during the first term of the George W. Bush
administration the U.S. government was openly hostile to the ICC and
took aggressive steps to ensure it could not exercise jurisdiction over
U.S. nationals. The shift toward a more friendly relationship with the
Court did not begin when President Obama took office, but rather
during the second term of the Bush administration. Early in President
Bush’s second term, his administration allowed the UN Security
Council to refer the situation in Darfur, Sudan to the ICC, and made
clear its willingness to support the Prosecutor’s work on that situation.
President Barack Obama built upon the shift his predecessor
initiated. After undertaking an inter-agency review of U.S. policy
toward the ICC, the Obama administration developed a forwardleaning relationship with the Court, actively supporting prosecutions
based on a case-by-case assessment. Yet at no time did that
administration contemplate U.S. adherence to the Rome Statute.
The next administration brought another major shift in policy.
Although President Trump is no fan of the ICC, his administration did
not aggressively attack the Court until two developments converged.
First, Bolton became National Security Advisor. Second, the ICC
Prosecutor moved toward announcing whether she would seek to open
an investigation against Americans, among others, in Afghanistan.20
Although Bolton has returned to private life, Secretary of State
Mike Pompeo has continued to espouse and act upon the policy he
crafted by, for example, announcing that the ICC prosecutor cannot
travel within the United States outside New York, and then only for
official UN business.21

20. See Owen Bowcott et al., John Bolton Threatens War Crimes Court with Sanctions in
Virulent Attack, GUARDIAN (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2018/sep/10/john-bolton-castigate-icc-washington-speech.
21. See AFP, US to Deny Visas for ICC Members Investigating War Crimes, GUARDIAN
(Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/mar/15/mike-pompeo-us-warcrimes-investigation-international-criminal-court; see also Patrick Wintour et al., US Revokes
ICC Prosecutor’s Visa over Afghanistan Inquiry, GUARDIAN (Apr. 5, 2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2019/apr/05/us-revokes-visa-of-international-criminalcourts-top-prosecutor. More recently—after these remarks were delivered—Pompeo publicly
attacked by name, and expressed a veiled threat against, two members of the ICC Prosecutor’s
staff. See Secretary Michael R. Pompeo’s Remarks to the Press, Mar. 17, 2020, at
https://www.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-remarks-to-the-press-6/.
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If the Trump administration’s ICC policy was defined in
significant part by Bolton, whom I would not characterize as a populist,
it is now suffused with the populist perspectives of the president.
Trump has made no secret of his disdain for the principles of
humanitarian law the ICC enforces; how often has he extolled the good
old days when you could torture suspects and execute alleged
traitors?22 And a president who nullifies war crimes convictions
imposed by U.S. military courts23 would scarcely abide ICC
proceedings against American nationals.
In short, the current U.S. stance toward the ICC represents a
robust version of American exceptionalism, now infused with a strong
measure of populist sentiment. This assuredly poses a heightened
threat to the ICC, already weakened by the confluence of various
challenges noted earlier.24
Let me now turn to the other questions I noted at the outset of my
remarks. First, in a landscape of myriad challenges to the project of
global justice, which should concern us?
The short and obvious answer, I believe, is that we should be far
more worried about developments that threaten the core values of
human security the ICC’s work is designed to protect than by critiques
of the Court’s performance. With respect to the latter, there are
perfectly legitimate questions to be raised about how well recent
models of human protection, including international criminal tribunals,
have worked. Indeed, it is incumbent on us to ensure that institutions
designed to protect fundamental rights are working as well as possible.
In contrast, when President Trump says the United States has no
reason to worry about a Turkish slaughter of Kurds in Northern Syria
because “it has nothing to do with us,”25 he strikes at the deepest
interests of our shared humanity and at the heart of the liberal
international order in which the United States provided leadership for
22. See, e.g., Jonathan Swan, Trump Said CIA Director Gina Haspel Agreed with Him
“100%” on Torture, AXIOS (Nov. 17, 2019), https://www.axios.com/trump-gina-haspel-ciatorture-waterboarding-f8c4b63b-7825-4cc9-9ff3-128c759f5eee.html.
23. Dave Philipps, Trump Reverses Navy’s Decision to Oust SEAL Accused of War
Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/21/us/trump-sealseddie-gallagher.html.
24. Matt Apuzzo & Marlise Simons, U.S. Attack on I.C.C. Is Seen as Bolstering World’s
Despots, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/13/world/
europe/icc-burundi-bolton.html.
25. Peter Baker & Catie Edmondson, Trump Lashes Out on Syria as Republicans Rebuke
Him in House Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/10/16/world/middleeast/trump-erdogan-turkey-syria-kurds.html.
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70 years. And when an American president tells leaders of murderous
regimes he thinks they are doing a great job,26 that too threatens the
fragile fabric of global commitment to human rights, and has more farreaching repercussions than similar comments from most other
leaders.
Let me briefly address the final question I posed earlier: In light
of myriad challenges I have noted, are we reaching the end of an era
of global justice?
Inevitably the fate of this enterprise is tied up with wider
challenges to human rights posed by populism. The degree to which
the sentiments Trump has expressed strike fertile soil elsewhere is
crucial in this sphere as in many others. For international justice is
inextricably linked to a belief in the sanctity of every human life and
recognition of a global responsibility to protect vulnerable individuals
from grave harm.
The success of international justice is also tightly linked to the
ability of civil society actors to advocate and organize.27 Yet an
alarming feature of the emerging global landscape—in particular,
resurgent nationalism—is that the space for such advocacy has not
only shrunk but closed in many countries.28
Despite these challenges, which are very serious indeed, I believe
the core enterprise of global justice has a promising future. But it
needs a robust process of course correction to remain viable.
To the first point, while my previous remarks focused on
challenges to core aspects and institutions of international justice, the
demand for justice remains powerful. National Public Radio (NPR)
recently aired an interview with a young man who survived brutal
torture in Syria, Omar Alshogre, and lost his father, brothers and
cousins to the ruthless practices of the Assad regime. Now in Sweden,
Alshogre devotes his life to laying the groundwork for an eventual
reckoning. As NPR reporter Deborah Amos put it, “his faith in justice

26. Scott Simon, Opinion: A President in Praise of Strongmen and Dictators, NPR (Oct.
20, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/20/659024594/opinion-a-president-in-praise-ofstrongmen-and-dictators.
27. Cf. Karen J. Alter et al., Backlash against International Courts in West, East and
Southern Africa: Causes and Consequences, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 293, 321–22 (2016)
(identifying key role of civil society mobilization in containing backlashes against
international courts that are not criminal in nature).
28. See Hilal Tekmen, Populism and Closing Civic Space: A Post-Truth Challenge, 16
TURKISH POL’Y Q. 105, 109 (June 16, 2017).
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keeps him going.”29 I have seen the same determination to ensure
justice, however long it takes, in many places where the pillars of
human protection have collapsed.
The mobilization of victims has produced truly remarkable
milestones even as the most visible institution of global justice, the
ICC, has at times faltered. Think of the prosecution of former Chadian
dictator Hissène Habré in Senegal: Survivors of his ruthless crimes
pursued justice for a quarter century before they found justice in an
extraordinary court.
Much the same determination has led to groundbreaking
prosecutions before national courts exercising universal jurisdiction
despite the previously-noted backlash against some countries’ use of
this principle.30
As for the ICC, there is important work now underway that
explores how the Court can be retooled not only to conduct more
successful investigations and prosecutions itself, but also to better
answer the needs of victims in the places they live. The crucial idea
behind much of this work involves reorienting the Court to do
something many of its supporters have long claimed it should do—
incentivizing and empowering domestic prosecutors and other actors
to bring justice home, where it is most desperately needed.31
***
In closing, the model of global justice that emerged in the 1990s
is now reeling from multiple blows, whose origins lie largely outside
the province of ascendant populism but which now draw strength from
it. For the most part those challenges are manageable—more so, I
believe, than other fundamental threats posed by contemporary
manifestations of populism.
29. Deborah Amos, Survivor of Torture in Syria’s Prisons Is Telling His Story, NPR
(Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/09/24/763679511/survivor-of-torture-in-syriasprisons-is-telling-his-story.
30. See, e.g., Ben Hubbard, Germany Takes Rare Step in Putting Syrian Officers on Trial
in
Torture
Case,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Apr.
23,
2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/23/world/middleeast/syria-germany-war-crimestrial.html?searchResultPosition=1; Christopher F. Schuetze, German Trial Accuses Iraqi of
Genocide in Killing of Yazidi Girl, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/25/world/europe/germany-genocide-trial-iraqyazidi.html?searchResultPosition=1.
31. For an excellent treatment of this issue, see Christian M. De Vos, COMPLEMENTARITY,
CATALYSTS, COMPLIANCE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN UGANDA, KENYA, AND
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (forthcoming Apr. 2020).
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To meet these challenges, human rights advocates and other key
actors will have to regroup, reconsider strategies and models in which
they have heavily invested, forge new alliances, and innovate, all while
keeping firmly in sight the urgent claims of our common humanity.

